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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On or about August 10, 2005, Plaintiff! Appellant John Block (hereinafter referred to as 
"Block") purchased land from Jack Streibick (hereinafter referred to as "Streibick") and the 
estate of Streibick's deceased wife. R. Vol. 1, p. 13. This property was within the City of 
Lewiston, Idaho. Id. After Block purchased the property, it was subdivided several times, and 
houses were built on the property, R. Vol. I, pp. 13 - 15. After the houses were constructed, 
defects were discovered in or around three of the properties, which, despite numerous repairs to 
the properties at issue, ultimately resulted in two of the three houses having to be removed from 
the properties and the third house having significant structural repair. R. Vol. I, pp. 57 - 58. 
Block alleges that the problems with these three houses resulted from a number of issues 
(including having built on property with improperly placed fill, having built on a landslide fault, 
etc.), but which he generally referred to as the property having a "defective condition". R. Vol. I, 
pp. 17 - 18, 20. Block also built a number of other houses on the properties that he purchased 
from Streibick, none of which suffered any physical damage, but for which Block is claiming 
lost value. R. Vol. II, pp. 348, 353 - 55. 
Block brought claims against Streibick (and Streibick's deceased wife's estate) for 
misrepresentation, breach of the affirmative duty to disclose, breach of implied warranty, breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. R. Vol. I, pp. 20 - 23. Block also 
brought claims against the City of Lewiston (hereinafter referred to as the "City") and former 
City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw ("Cutshaw") for negligence and gross negligence. R. Vol. 1, pp. 
23 - 25. 
This appeal only has to do with Block's negligence claims against the City and Cutshaw. 
The claims against Streibick were settled and Block agreed to dismiss those claims. R. Vol. 1, p. 
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7; Vol. IV, pp. 727, 730. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the City and Cutshaw on all 
of Block's claims, on the grounds that the City and Cutshaw were immune under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, and that no duty was owed to Block. R. Vol. IV, p. 837. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
Block has presented a fairly exhaustive Statement of the Case in his opening brief. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 7 - 17. Further, relevant facts were presented in the briefing on the various 
summary judgments. R. Vol. I, pp. 55 - 59; R. Vol. II, pp. 356 - 64. The City and Cutshaw 
present just those additional necessary facts, along with pointing out errors in Block's facts: 
With regard to Kenneth Morrison filling the canyon at issue (Appellant's Brief, p. 8), he 
testified that the fill was compacted and tested at the time it was done. R. Vol. II, p. 267 
(Morrison Dep., pp. 25 - 26). 
Block contends that a landslide happened in Sunset Palisades No.4 ("SP 4"), block 3, in 
1999. Appel/ant's Brief, p. 9. However, there is no evidence which supports that 
contention. The facts show that in 1999, Terry Howard (an independent engineer), while 
doing work on another project for Nez Perce County, saw cracks in the earth in SP 4, 
took photographs, and provided the photographs to the City. R. Vol. II, p. 248. There was 
no studv done bv Howard or Streibick as to how old the crack was, when it occurred, 
. . 
what caused it, or whether it was the result of earth movement or some other cause. There 
is no doubt that the City put the photograph in the SP 4 subdivision file, as that is where 
Block found it when he searched the file in 2009. R. Vol. II, p. 278. 
With regard to the detention pond at issue, it was originally constructed as part of SP 4, 
not Sunset Palisades 8 ("SP 8"). Appellant's Brief, p. 8. However, it did not work well, 
and filled in. Streibick later had to repair it when he subdivided SP 4, block 3, into SP 8 
in 2005. When Block later subdivided SP 8 into Canyon Greens ("CG"), at the suggestion 
of his engineer, he moved it to the bottom of the hill, where it currently sits. 
Block contends he purchased SP 8 from Streibick in December, 2005. Appel/ant's Brief, 
p. 10. This is incorrect. The purchase documents were signed August 10, 2005. See R. 
Vol. I, p. 13 (Verified Complaint, ~ 11). SP 8 was not approved until later in August, 
2005. R. Vol. II, pp. 257 - 58 (Administrative Plat for SP 8), 259 - 60 (Amended 
Administrative Plat for SP 8). 
Block contends that "could not have discovered evidence of the 1999 landslide by simply 
reviewing the City's files on the lots he purchased." Appel/ant's Brief, p. 15. However, as 
pointed out above, this is incorrect. Though Block may have intended to purchase lots 1 -
4 of SP 8, when he signed the purchase agreement on August 10, 2005, the plat for SP 8 
had not been recorded or approved yet. R. Vol. II, pp. 368 - 69 (City Council meeting at 
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which approval took place did not occur until August 15, 2005). Therefore, the only 
subdivision file at which Block could have looked (if he had chosen to look at a City file, 
which he did not do), was SP 4, which, as Block later pointed out, had the Tim Richard 
memo in it. R. Vol. I, p. 17 (Complaint, ~ 23). 
Prior to contracting for the installation of the helical piers to resolve the 2007 slope 
movement, Block was specifically told that without doing a slope stability analysis, it 
would be impossible to know whether installation of the helical piers would resolve the 
issues with his house. R. Vol. I, p. 82. 
The company Block hired to give him advice on his property in 2007 (Strata, Inc.), 
Appellant's Brief, p. 12, was the same company that Terry Howard worked for when he 
took the picture of the alleged slope movement in 1999. R. Vol. II, p. 296. 
Block states that the City did not inform him that fill had been placed on the property. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 14 - 15. However, Block has admitted that he knew he was 
building on fill. R. Vol. II, p. 282 (Block Dep., pp. 195 - 96). 
Block contends he "did conduct reasonable due diligence" prior to purchasing the 
property. Appellant's Brief, p. 16. This contradicts his prior statements. Block has 
admitted that he purchased the lots without walking the properties and without doing any 
due diligence. R. Vol. II, pp. 279 - 80 (Block Dep., pp. 184 - 85). 
Block contends that he may have forgone purchase of the property had the City disclosed 
the defects in the property. Appellant's Brief, p. 16. However, Block provides no 
evidence that he ever communicated with the City about the property prior to signing the 
purchase documents in August, 2005. 
Block's expert testified that all of Block's losses were economic. R. Vol. II, pp. 344, 346 
(Rudd Dep., pp. 41,50 - 51). There was no allegation of physical damage to the houses 
which were built on Canyon Greens 2 ("CG 2"). R. Vol. II, p. 348 (Rudd Dep., pp. 112-
13). 
Prior to 1997, the Lewiston City Subdivision Code had requirements for mandatory slope 
stability and/or geotechnical analysis. See R. Vol. II, pp. 387 - 440. In 1997, the City of 
Lewiston substantially revised the Subdivision Code pursuant to Lewiston City 
Ordinance 4177. Id. After Ordinance 4177, requirements for slope stability and/or 
geotechnical analysis of property was discretionary. Id. (specifically §§ 32-9(b)(2)(f), 32-
20(c)(2) and 32-31(e)). 
All subdivision plats at issue were approved by the Lewiston City Council, and other 
entities with authority to approve such plans/designs. R. Vol. II, pp. 257 - 62 (plats of SP 
8 and CG, and amended plat for SP 8). 
c. Procedural History 
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Block filed a Notice of Tort Claim against the City and Cutshaw on or around August 26, 
2009. R. Vol. I, p. 58. On or around October 22,2009, he filed a Complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 11. This 
Complaint contained multiple breach of contract causes of action against Streibick. Against the 
City and Cutshaw, it only contained one negligence cause of action, R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 25, though 
such negligence cause of action had numerous subparts, as follows: 
55. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others had a duty to act with 
reasonable care under the circumstances and without negligence. The City of 
Lewiston, Cutshaw, the City Engineer(s) and Others, acting within the course of 
their employment or duties, breached that duty of care by 
(i) failing to notify and/or warn Block at the time he sought building permits 
for 153,155 and 159 and Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7 of canyon Greens No. 
2 of earth movement that the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and Others knew 
had occurred in 1999 within the area of 153, 155 and 159 and that such 
earth movement had neither been eliminated nor properly abated in any 
manner, 
(ii) failing to take any action to prevent, restrict or regulate development 
within the area of 153, 155 and 159 until such earth movement had been 
eliminated or properly abated, 
(iii) failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155, and 
159 be eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to 
Block's purchase of the Property, 
(iv) failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155, and 159 
to Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such earth movement 
had occurred in 1999 or without having eliminated or properly abated such 
earth movement 
(v) failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water 
improvements in 1994 for Palisades No.4 subdivision and approving and 
allowing Streibick's construction of a storm water detention pond within 
the area of 153 where the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew 
earth movement had occurred in 1999, thereby contributing to the 
instability of soil in that area, 
(vi) approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without 
notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement had occurred on 153, 
155 and 159 in 1999 and had not been eliminated or properly abated; 
(vii) failing to require an approved design or plan incorporating engineering 
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standards applicable to the grading, filling, compacting of soil, detaining 
of storm water and constructing of residences on the Property and failing 
to approve such a design or plan and/or to require compliance with such 
design or plan prior to any such improvements being allowed by the City 
of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others and/or undertaken to eliminate or 
properly abate such earth movement within the area of 153, 155 and 159; 
(viii) failing to act with ordinary care to protect against the likely risks, danger 
and adverse consequences from such earth movement the City of 
Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew had occurred in the area of 153, 
155 and 159in 1999; 
(ix) failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate 
the dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result of such earth 
movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159; 
(x) failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 
153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment 
of such earth movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk 
of harm; and 
(xi) failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of Streibick's 
development activities within the area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 
and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the 
creation of a dangerous condition and risk of harm. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 25 (Complaint, ,-r 55). 
The City and Cutshaw initially filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied. 
R. Vol. I, p. 179. After significant discovery, the City and Cutshaw filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on June 28, 2011. R Vol. I, p. 213. The City and Cutshaw argued several 
reasons why summary judgment should be granted. A hearing on the second Motion for 
Summary Judgment was held on August 9, 2011. Tr. Vol. I, p. 4. On Oct. 14, 2011, Judge 
Kerrick issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting the City's and Cutshaw's second 
Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds. R. Vol. IV, p. 816. 
On October 28, 2011 Block filed a Motion for Reconsideration. R. Vol. IV, p. 839. A 
hearing was held on Block's Motion for Reconsideration on November 29,2011. R. Vol. I, p. 10. 
On January 4, 2012, Judge Kerrick issued a Memorandum Opinion on Block's Motion for 
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Reconsideration, affirming the prior Memorandum Decision. R. Vol. V, p. 1020. Judgment was 
entered on behalf of the City and Lowell Cutshaw on February 1,2012. R. Vol. V, pp. 1033 - 34. 
Block filed a Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2012. R. Vol. V, p. 1023. 
II. RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
It is the understanding of the City and Cutshaw that Block is appealing each of the bases 
on which summary judgment was granted below (i.e. whether there was a duty owed to Block, 
whether the economic loss rule applied, and whether the immunities under I C §§ 6-904(1) and 
(7) and 6-904B(3) and (4) apply). The City and Cutshaw also state the following issues on 
appeal: 
1. Can the Judgment in favor of the City and Cutshaw be affirmed on any grounds other 
than what was decided by Judge Kerrick? 
2. Are the City and Cutshaw entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to IC §§ 12-
117, 6-918A, or any other applicable statute or rule? 
3. Are the City and Cutshaw entitled to costs on appeal pursuant to IA.R. 40,IR.CP. 
54, or any other applicable statute or rule? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. BECAUSE THE CITY AND CUTSHAW HAVE NO DUTY TO ALL FUTURE 
OWNERS OF A PROPERTY, BLOCK CANNOT PREVAIL ON ALLEGED 
NEGLIGENCE WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR TO PURCHASE OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
The City and Cutshaw made two general duty arguments: there was no duty to Block 
before he owned the property, and there was no duty to protect against economic loss (discussed 
in more detail in § B below). With regard to the former, such arguments only applied to a portion 
of Block's claims, specifically Complaint ~~ 55 (iii - v, ix - xi). On this issue, Judge Kerrick 
concluded that "The City does not owe a duty to any person who may purchase land in Lewiston, 
from any current landowner, at a future date." R. Vol. IV, p. 827. Block now makes several 
arguments as to why a duty was owed to Block (though it is not clear that Block is limiting the 
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discussion of duty to the time prior to when he purchased the property). Appel/ant's Brief, pp. 18 
- 25. The City will address each of Block's arguments in turn. 
1. Block's Negligence Per Se Argument Should be Reiected Because it was 
Presented for the First Time on Appeal, and Because Block Cannot Establish 
Negligence Per Se. 
First, Block makes a negligence per se argument, contending that the City Subdivision 
Ordinance should replace the standard duty of care. Appel/ant's Brief, pp. 19 - 21. This is the 
first time that negligence per se has been addressed in this case, as it was never plead in the 
Complaint. l Judge Kerrick's Memorandum Opinions (both on the original motion for summary 
judgment and the motion for reconsideration) never once mention negligence per se. See R. Vol. 
IV, pp. 820 - 27 (discussing negligence arguments) and Vol. V, pp. 1010 - 16 (discussing 
negligence arguments). Perhaps this was because Block never addressed it, in either his briefing 
on the motion for summary judgment or motion for reconsideration. R. Vol. III, pp. 459 - 75 
(Opposition to Summary Judgment, discussion of duties), and Vol. V, pp. 965 - 68 (Amended 
Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, discussing the City's duty). Block cannot now 
raise this issue for the first time on appeal. "The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will 
not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 
340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008) (quoting Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 
P.3d 435, 438 (2007)). See also Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 101, 106 P.3d 425, 427 
(2005) (same holding); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001) (holding the 
same). Block should not now be allowed to argue a new substantive issue on appeal which was 
never addressed to the Court below. 
Even if the Court were to consider Block's negligence per se argument, Block cannot 
See R. Vo!. I, pp. 23 - 25 (allegations against the City and Cutshaw). Failure to plead negligence per se is 
not always dispositive. See Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co .. Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 898-99, 188 P.3d 834, 840-41 
(2008) (a party need not specifically plead negligence per se in order to receive a jury instruction on such issue). 
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show the four elements necessary to establish negligence per se. See O'Guin v. Bingham County, 
142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005) (discussing elements of negligence per se); 
Obendorf, at 899, 841 (same). First, Block points to language in Lewiston City Code §§ 32-2, 
32-8, 32-9, and 32-31. Appellant's Brief, pp. 19 - 20. These sections either contain discretionary 
language or give general guidelines and do not "clearly define the required standard of conduct." 
Obendorfat 899, 841. For example, § 32-2 is titled "Purpose and Intent", and does not give any 
specific mandates. R. Vol. II, p. 387. Similarly, § 32-31 deals with "opinion[s] of the subdivision 
committee", Appellant's Brief, p. 20, which does not clearly define standards of conduct. As to § 
32-9, the only action required is that the City "inspect the site", and then if the city engineer so 
requires, have certain additional studies done. Appellant's Brief, p. 20. Again, this discretion 
does not set forth clearly defined standards of conduct. 
Block also cannot show that the Lewiston City Codes were designed to protect him. 
Obendorfat 899, 841. As one court has stated, "It is apparent from the language of the [building 
code], and from commentators that "[t]he primary purpose of such codes and ordinances is ... to 
protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect the personal 
or property interests of individuals." Island Shores Estates Condo. Ass'n v. City of Concord, 136 
N.H. 300, 307, 615 A.2d 629, 633 (1992). The Lewiston Subdivision Code was not intended to 
protect the developer, but the City and its residents. See Lewiston City Code § 32-2(a) (R. Vo!. II, 
p.387). 
Block also can't establish the fourth element of negligence per se, in that he cannot show 
that the City's and/or Cutshaw's negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. Obendorf at 
899,841. Though not ruled on by Judge Kerrick2, the City and Cutshaw contended that there was 
2 The City and Cutshaw still seek to have judgment affirmed on these grounds. "The respondent can seek to 
sustain a judgment for reasons that were presented to the trial court even though they were not addressed or relied 
upon by the trial court in its decision." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 39198-2011,2012 
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no evidence before the District Court (nor is there in the record before this court) of what caused 
the slope movement which resulted in injury to Block's properties. R. Vol. 1, pp. 201 - 02. 
Block's experts have admitted that without doing a geotechnical evaluation of the property 
(which they have not done), they cannot know what caused the slope movement. R. Vol. IV, pp. 
713 - 14. There must be some evidence of causation, or else an essential element of a negligence 
claim is not met. See Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997); Nation v. State, 
144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007) (essential element of negligence claim is causation); Esterbrook v. 
State, 124 Idaho 680, 683 (1993) (burden of proof for negligence is on Plaintiff). Because 
Block's own experts don't know what caused the slope movement, see R. Vol. IV, pp. 713 - 14, 
Block cannot establish that the City or Cutshaw proximately caused his injuries. Therefore, the 
City and Cutshaw request that this Court determine that negligence per se does not apply. 
2. Block Incorrectly Argues that the Public Duty Rule Establishes a Duty to Him. 
Next, Block addresses the public duty rule. Judge Kerrick found the "public duty rule" to 
be instructive, and determined that no liability could attach to the City and Cutshaw because no 
duty existed. Block attempts to argue that the City had a public duty to provide information and 
handle applications in a particular manner. Appellant's Brief, pp. 21 - 22. However, the public 
duty rule does not apply in the manner which Block states, nor does it create any duty to Block 
(or any potential future land owner) before the property is purchased. The existence of a duty is a 
question oflaw. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247 (1999). "No liability arises from the law 
of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 
389 (2001). Numerous Idaho cases have made it clear that a party cannot recover from a 
governmental entity for failure to perform a duty owed to the public at large. "[I]f the duty which 
WL 6620615 at *6 (Idaho Dec. 20, 2012) (citing Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290, 
292 (1987». 
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the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an 
inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual, injury, and must be 
redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution." Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 
359 (1943). See also Worden v. Witt, 4 Idaho 404, 406 - 07 (1895). 
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from 
injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Applying this 
principle to governmental torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires 
that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the 
general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable. 
Radke v. County o{Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005) (cited in Rees v. State, 143 
Idaho 10, 16 (2006)). Two cases illustrate this concept. In Udy v. Custer County, the plaintiff 
argued that a sheriff who saw rocks lying on a road (which later caused a motor vehicle accident) 
had a duty to clear the rocks or give notice to someone to move them. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389. 
This Court stated 
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which there 
can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. Here, the record 
does not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special 
relationship with Sheriff Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have 
been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to 
establish a duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for Sheriff 
Roskelley's liability in tort. 
Udy, 136 Idaho at 391. In other words, absent a special relationship, there was no duty owed to 
the plaintiff just because there may have been a duty to the public at large. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has dealt with a similar issue. In Island Shores 
Estates Condo. Ass'n v. City o{Concord, 136 N.H. 300, 615 A.2d 629 (1992), the plaintiff was a 
condominium association who sued the city for issuing occupancy permits after (allegedly) 
improperly inspecting the condominiums. Id. at 302, 630. The plaintiff contended that the city's 
failure to discover "a litany of flaws . . . constitutes gross negligence and the construction 
approved by defendant threatens the structural integrity of the units and the health and safety of 
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its occupants; that resultant harm to the owners of the units has occurred." Id. In dismissing the 
claims against the city, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated the following: 
As developed, the public duty rule represents a limitation on liability for 
municipal acts that are carried out for the general welfare. In cases where by 
statute or ordinance a public official has a general duty to perform a function for 
the public's benefit, it has been held that liability will not be imposed for the 
negligent performance of this duty, unless the plaintiff can establish an individual 
duty owed him. 
Id. at 303,631. Ultimately, the New Hampshire Supreme Court did not even discuss whether the 
duty was public or not, because "a duty must exist before we reach the question of whether it is a 
public duty or a private duty. We do not reach any issues involving the public duty rule because 
we find the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff." Id. at 304, 631. The court went on to 
state that 
We note the countervailing interests in limiting the duty of the city. The 
defendant asserts the danger of making the city the insurer of every building 
project if the issuance of a certificate of occupancy is deemed a representation 
upon which the world can rely. The recognition of the dangers of such unlimited 
liability is not a vestige of municipal immunity, but is a consideration that must 
be a factor in every negligence analysis. 
The city is not engaged in the trade of inspecting buildings to help buyers 
determine the commercial feasibility of building ownership. Had the plaintiff 
wished to assure itself of the commercial feasibility of the construction, the duty 
was the plaintiffs, and could have been met by utilizing its own resources or by 
hiring private contractors. By using different standards and focusing on different 
aspects, the private contractor may well have presented information that caused 
the plaintiffs members to corne to different conclusions as to the financial 
wisdom of purchasing their units. Such private business considerations are 
unrelated to the purpose of the municipality's inspection, which must remain 
focused on setting and enforcing sufficient standards to ensure the safety of 
structures. 
Id. at 306-07,633. With regard to the second allegation in Island Shores (that a duty arose under 
the city building codes), the court held that such codes no duty existed because the codes are to 
"protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect the 
personal or property interests of individuals." Id. at 307,633. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11 
The same analysis should apply in this case. Despite Block's contentions that the City 
and/or Cutshaw owed him a duty to provide accurate information3, there is no reason to make the 
City liable for acts done prior to Block's purchase of the property. Such a duty would create 
crushing burden on municipalities, and potentially subject them to enduring liability. See Rife v. 
Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143, 148-49 (1995) (imposing a duty on a school district 
to protect students after school hours would be debilitating). If, as in Rife and Summers v. 
Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004), a school 
district has no duty to its students when they leave its custody, a city certainly should not have a 
duty to someone before they purchase property. In any case, Block's claims don't make logical 
sense. For example, Block contends that the City was negligent in failing to prevent Streibick 
from selling the property to Block. R. Vol. I, p. 24 (Complaint, ~ 55(iv)). How the City could 
have prevented such a sale (absent exercising eminent domain) is impossible to guess, as cities 
are not generally notified before property is sold. Block certainly never provided the City with a 
chance to give him information about the property before he purchased it4, because he never 
asked the City any questions about the property before signing the sales contract. R. Vol. II, p. 
279. Therefore, the City and Cutshaw ask that this Court conclude that Judge Kerrick properly 
ruled no duty was owed to Block before he purchased the property.s 
3. Block Cannot Show a Duty Arose Due to a Special Relationship Between Block 
and the City. 
Block's third allegation is that there was a special relationship between the City/Cutshaw 
See Appellant's Brief, p. 22 (citing Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 596 P.2d 1096 (Wash. App. Div. 3, 1979». 
4 This case is distinguished from Rogers based on the fact that the plaintiff in Rogers actually went and asked 
the city for information about the property before it was purchased. Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 23 Wash. App. 554, 
555,596 P.2d 1096 (1979). Block never made such a request for information from the City or Cutshaw until 2009, 
four years after he purchased the property. R. Vol. II, p. 279. 
To the extent that Block contends the City owed him a duty after he purchased the property, see Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 21 - 22, no duty exists to protect from economic loss. See§ B, below. 
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and Block. Appellant's Brief, pp. 22 - 24. Block argues that this special relationship arose under 
the public duty rule, citing the four-part test utilized in Rees v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 
143 Idaho 10, 16, 137 P.3d 397, 403 (2006). However, that test applied to whether an affirmative 
duty arose to protect a child suspected of suffering from child abuse. Id. at 15, 402. Even if the 
test did apply, Block's contention that "there exists genuine issues of material fact" regarding the 
elements of the test (see Appellant's Brief, p. 24) would not bar summary judgment, as the 
existence of a duty is a question of law, not of fact. Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 675, 
273 P.3d 1266, 1268 (2012). In any case, Block couldn't meet the elements of the Rees test. 
Block contends that the City had knowledge of a dangerous condition, i.e. the 1999 landslide. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 24. While Block can show that the City was notified of alleged earth 
movement in or around 1999, he cannot show that it actually was earth movement, when the 
earth movement occurred, whether anyone knew if it would occur again, what caused it, or if the 
movement had stabilized. Thus, he has nothing more than speculation that the condition, as it 
appeared in 1999, was dangerous. Second, Block cannot show that he relied on anything prior to 
purchasing the property, because he admits he never asked the City anything. Third, Block also 
cannot show that any ordinance was intended for his protection, as opposed to general protection 
of the pUblic.6 Thus, there was no special relationship with Block prior to his purchase of the 
property. 
4. The City Could Not Assume a Duty to Block Six Years Before he Purchased the 
Property. 
Finally, Block contends that the City assumed a duty to him by putting a memo with 
pictures of the 1999 earth movement in the SP 4 file. Appellant's Brief, p. 25. In essence, he 
6 Again, building codes "protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect 
the personal or property interests of individuals." Island Shores Estates Condo. Ass'n, 136 N.H. at 307, 615 A.2d at 
633. 
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argues the City assumed a duty to him in 1999, six years before he purchased the property. This 
makes little sense. Legally, a party cannot assume a general duty. See Martin v. Twin Falls Sch. 
Dist. No. 411, 138 Idaho 146, 150, 59 P.3d 317, 321 (2002) ("When a party assumes a duty by 
voluntarily performing an act that the party had no duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited 
to the duty actually assumed."); Udy, 136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069 (by voluntarily removing 
rocks and other debris from the highway on other prior occasions, the county sheriff did not 
assume the duty of doing so on the night in question); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,903 P.2d 
73 (1995) (by helping some troubled students in the past, teacher did not assume the duty of 
helping a particular student who later committed suicide). In other words, the City could not 
have assumed a duty to every potential future owner (including Block) of the property just by 
putting a picture in a subdivision file in 1999. No favorable reading of the facts leads to the 
conclusion that the City and Cutshaw assumed a duty to Block. 
In sum, Block has misconstrued the argument made by the City and Cutshaw with regard 
to duty. The only argument made is that the City and Cutshaw owed no duty to Block before he 
purchased the property at issue. Most of Block's arguments apply to after he purchased the 
property. Therefore, the City and Cutshaw request that this Court conclude that Judge Kerrick 
properly dismissed those of Block's claims which allege negligence prior to his purchase of the 
property. 
B. THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO THIS CASE BECAUSE ALL OF 
BLOCK'S LOSSES WERE LOST PROFITS AND OTHER PURELY ECONOMIC 
LOSSES, AND NO EXCEPTION APPLIES. 
In addition to the duty arguments discussed above, the City and Cutshaw contend that no 
duty was owed to Block because, under the economic loss rule, "Unless an exception applies, the 
economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence action because 
there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 14 
Pump Co. Inc., 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 at *7 (Idaho Dec. 20,2012) (quoting Blahd v. 
Richard B. Smith. Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 PJd 996, 1000 (2005)). Stated another way, 
"this Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all 
negligence actions." Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 
1200 (1995). As all of Block's claims against the City and Cutshaw are negligence based, Block 
may not recover if he only suffered economic loss. 
The City and Cutshaw contend that all of Block's loss constituted economic loss. Further, 
the City and Cutshaw contend that there is no exception to the economic loss rule. These issues 
will be discussed below. 
1. The Economic Loss Rule Should Apply because the only Damage was to Property 
which was the Subject Matter of the Transaction between Block and Streibick. 
Block contends that his losses are not economic because he suffered property damage, 
thus preventing the application of the economic loss rule. Appellant's Brief, p. 44. However, the 
facts, the law, and Block's own admissions result in the conclusion that all of Block's losses fall 
under the definition of economic loss. Block is trying to recover his contractual expectation 
damages against the City and Cutshaw under a negligence claim. This should not be allowed. 
The history of the economic loss rule shows that the economic loss rule was created to 
prevent parties from seeking contract damages under tort claims. 
The purpose of the economic loss rule is to define the line between recovery in 
tort and recovery in contract, and it reflects an attempt to maintain the separation 
or distinction between contract law and tort law. The rule prevents the law of 
contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. 
63B Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 1797. As another source states, 
The economic-loss doctrine forbids a party from suing or recovering in tort for 
economic or pecuniary losses that arise only from breach of contract or are 
associated with the contract relationship .... The doctrine provides that a 
contracting party who suffers purely economic losses, which is the loss of the 
benefit of one's bargain, must seek his or her remedy in contract and not in tort as 
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such claims are instead governed by contract law. 
74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 24. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "The economic loss rule is a 
judicially created doctrine that marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, which 
protects expectancy interests created through agreement between the parties, and tort law, which 
protects individuals and their property from physical ham1 by imposing a duty of reasonable 
care." Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing. 
LC, 221 P.3d 234, 242 (UT 2009). See also Town orAlma v. Azco Const., Inc., 10 PJd 1256, 
1259 (Colo. 2000) ("Broadly speaking, the economic loss rule is intended to maintain the 
boundary between contract law and tort law."); Dewayne Rogers Logging. Inc. v. Propac Indus.! 
Ltd., 299 S.W.3d 374,382-83 (Tex. App. 2009) ("When the only loss or damage is to the subject 
matter of the contract, the plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the contract."). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has recognized that breach of contract and negligence claims "are two distinct theories of 
recovery." Aardema v. US. Dairy Svs., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 790, 215 P.3d 505,510 (2009). The 
Supreme Court of Colorado has summadzed the rationale of the economic loss rule: 
Although originally born from products liability law, the application of the 
economic loss rule is broader, because it serves to maintain a distinction between 
contract and tort law. The essential difference between a tort obligation and a 
contract obligation is the source of the duties of the parties. 
Tort obligations generally arise from duties imposed by law. Tort law is designed 
to protect all citizens from the risk of physical harm to their persons or to their 
property. These duties are imposed by law without regard to any agreement or 
contract. 
In contrast, contract obligations arise from promises made between parties. 
Contract law is intended to enforce the expectancy interests created by the pm1ies' 
promises so that they can allocate risks and costs during their bargaining. 
Limiting tort liability when a contract exists between parties is appropriate 
because a product's potential nonperformance can be adequately addressed by 
rational economic actors bargaining at arms length to shape the terms of the 
contract. For example, a buyer may demand additional warranties on a product 
while agreeing to pay a higher price, or the same buyer may choose to assume a 
higher level of risk that a product will not perform properly by accepting a more 
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limited warranty in exchange for a lower product price. Limiting the availability 
of t011 remedies in these situations holds parties to the terms of their bargain. In 
this way, the law serves to encourage parties to confidently allocate risks and 
costs during their bargaining without fear that unanticipated liability may arise in 
the future, effectively negating the parties' efforts to build these cost 
considerations into the contract. The economic loss rule thus serves to ensure 
predictability in commercial transactions. 
Determining when a contract action will lie and when a tort action will lie 
requires maintaining this distinction in the sources of the respective obligations. 
The phrase "economic loss rule" necessarily implies that the focus of the inquiry 
under its analysis is on the type of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. 
However, the relationship between the type of damages suffered and the 
availability of a t011 action is inexact at best. Examining the type of damages 
suffered may assist in determining the source of the duty underlying the action 
(e.g., most actions for lost profits are based on breaches of contractual duties 
while most actions involving physical injuries to persons are based on common 
law duties of care). 
Town orAima, 10 P.3d at 1262-63. Thus, the essence of the economic loss rule is to prevent a 
party from attempting to recover contract based damages in tort. 
Though the economic loss rule arose out of product liability law, the Idaho Supreme 
COUli has recognized that it may apply outside of that realm. See Brian & Christie. Inc. v. 
Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 26, 244 P .3d 166, 170 (2010) ("The economic loss rule 
applies to negligence cases in general; its application is not restricted to products liability 
cases."). FUliher, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the economic loss rule's applicability 
where there is not even a contract between the plaintiff and defendant. See Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Imp. Ass'n, ] 26 Idaho 1002, 1005-06, 895 P.2d 1195, 1198-99 (1995) (no allegation of contract 
with the defendant Idaho Department of Agriculture, to whom the economic loss rule later 
applied).7 Thus, the economic loss rule may apply in this case where there is no allegation of a 
contract between Block and the City/Cutshaw. The question is then whether Block's losses 
7 Block makes a great deal out of the fact that there is no contract between the City/Cutshaw and Block. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 39 - 41. However, there is no case which states that the economic loss rule only applies when 
the defendant is a party to a contract. As DufJin points out above, the opposite is true. The economic loss rule may 
apply to parties, including governmental entities, even though they never had a contract with the plaintiff. 
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constitute economic loss. 
The Supreme Court has stated that "Economic loss includes costs of repair and 
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial 
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman 
Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351 (1975). This definition has been followed by a 
majority of cases addressing economic 10ss.8 This definition makes sense considering the history 
of the economic loss rule, as contractual damages typically include replacement or repair of the 
subject of the contract and lost profits or loss of use. See, e.g., Cuddy Mountain Concrete Inc. v. 
Citadel Canst., Inc., 121 Idaho 220, 225,824 P.2d 151, 156 (Ct. App. 1992) (lost profits allowed 
in contract actions); Ie § 28-2-714 (damages in contract actions). The Salmon River definition 
supposes that in order for there to be economic loss there be defective property which is the 
subject of the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec. , 
Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010). In other words, this definition can apply to cases 
"involving the purchase of defective personal property and real property." Id. at 170. The 
Supreme Court has excluded from the definition of economic loss "damage to property other 
than that which is the subject of the transaction." Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 
785, 791,215 P.3d 505, 511 (2009) (quoting Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196,983 P.2d 848, 
850 (1999)).9 As the Supreme Court has recently stated, "Damages from harm to person or 
property are not purely economic losses. [E]conomic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic 
to an injury to person or property." Stapleton, 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 at *7 (internal 
See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho lO02, 1007 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 
Idaho 37, 41 (1987); Blahdv. Richard B. Smith. Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300 (2005); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 
196 (1999); Aardema v. Us. Dairy Svs., 147 Idaho 785, 790 (2009). Cf Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., 
Inc., 244 P.3d 166,170 (Idaho 20lO) (holding that the definition provided of economic loss in the Salmon Rivers 
case does not apply to claims for economic loss related to services, as opposed to defective property). 
9 Also, a different standard applies when the contract involves services, as opposed to purchase of property. 
See Brian & Christie, Inc .. , 150 Idaho at 27,244 P.3d at 171; Oppenheimer Indus .. Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 
112 Idaho 423, 426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (1986). 
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citations and quotation marks omitted). The City and Cutshaw contend (and Judge Kerrick 
found 10) that there was no damage to separate property which would prevent the application of 
the economic loss rule. 
Block argues that because he only purchased bare property with an unknown defect in it, 
only damage to that bare property (as a result of the defect) would result in economic loss to 
Block. Appellant's Brief, p. 39. Block further contends that the improvements he made to the 
property suffered damage (cracks in house walls, warped floors, broken windows and gas lines, 
etc.), and because these improvements were not on the property when he purchased it, he has 
suffered damage to property which was not the subject of the transaction. Appellants' Brief, p. 
44. Based on this, Block contends he is entitled to recover all of his damages (i.e. damages to 
both the improvements and to the property itself). Appellant's Brief, p. 17. This argument is 
unsupportable. 
First, there is no case which Block has identified which indicates that damages to 
improvements to property (which Block has admitted is the subject of the transaction) constitutes 
damages to separate property. In fact, the opposite is quite true. For example, in Blahd v. Richard 
B. Smith. Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299, 108 P.3d 996, 999 (2005), the plaintiffs contemplated 
purchasing a house which apparently had a defect in it (a crack in a concrete slab in the basement 
of the house). Id. Regardless, the plaintiffs purchased the horne and added improvements (such 
as remodeling the house and adding slate tile to place over the crack). Id. When the newly laid 
tile cracked along the same lines as the original crack, the plaintiffs brought suit. ld. This court 
held that the negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule. ld. at 301, 1001. 
Similarly, in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1005, 895 P.2d 1195, 
1198 (1995), the plaintiffs purchased seed potatoes which had been inspected by the State, but 
10 R. Vo!. IV, p. 822. 
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which allegedly had bacterial ring rot. Id. The plaintiffs then planted the seed potatoes, and the 
potatoes grown from them were also infected. Id. Despite the fact that the new potato plants were 
damaged as a result of the defect in the subject matter of the contract (i.e. the seed potatoes), this 
Court held that the economic loss rule applied to the State. !d. at 1007, 1200. 
Under Block's theory, if improvements to the property constituted other property (and 
damage to the improvements constituted property damage), then both Blahd and Duffin were 
decided wrong. In Blahd, improvements made to the property (i.e. slate tile in the basement) 
were damaged by a defect in the property. Under Block's theory, this would be property damage, 
and thus void the economic loss rule with regard to all damages. See, e.g., Duffin, 126 Idaho at 
1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. The same is true with Duffin: under Block's theory, the damage to the 
new potatoes (which are by comparison the improvement to the seed potatoes) would constitute 
property damage, since the new potatoes were not the subject of the transaction. However, this 
Court has made it clear that damages to improvements to the "subject of the transaction" do not 
constitute property damage for purposes of the economic loss rule. Were this Court to accept 
such a proposition, the economic loss rule could simply be avoided by adding any minor or 
insignificant improvement to any property which was the "subject of the transaction", and when 
that improvement was damaged, sue in tort for what should have been contract damages. 
In support of his argument, Block relies on Aardema and Brian & Christie, Inc. However, 
these two cases do not support the conclusion that the addition of improvements to property will 
allow for negligence claims when the improvements are damaged. In Brian & Christie, Inc. v. 
Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 24, 244 P.3d 166, 168 (2010), the subject of the transaction 
was not actual property, but the rendition of a service. Id. Unlike Brian & Christie. Inc., there is 
no contract for services at issue in this case. Indeed, in Brian & Christie. Inc., the Supreme Court 
states outright that the "district court's attempt to apply [the property based] formulation of the 
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[economic loss] rule to a case involving the rendition of services illustrates why it does not apply 
to such cases." Id. at 26, 170. This Court ultimately held that negligent provision of a service 
which damages property is not subject to the economic loss rule. Id. at 29, 173. Such a holding 
does not apply to a situation in which a plaintiff purchases property with an unknown defect in it, 
as happened in this case, Blahd, Duffin, Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40, 740 P.2d 
1022, 1025 (1987), and a number of other cases. I I 
Block's reliance on Aardema is similarly faulty. Aardema at no point indicates that 
improvements to "the subject of the transaction" constitute separate property. In Aardema, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the milking system they had purchased caused damage to their cows. 
Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys.! Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 788, 215 P.3d 505, 508 (2009). The 
disagreement was whether the milking system or the cows were the "subject of the transaction". 
Id. at 791, 511. There was no allegation of improvements to the milking system, and it was clear 
that the cattle were separate property. This court held that "the milking machines are the subject 
of the transaction." Id There was no question in Aardema, as there is in this case (and as there 
was in Blahd) of improvements or attachments to the "subject of the transaction". Therefore, 
Aardema provides no guidance in this present case. 
Second (in addition to Block's inability to point to a case holding that damage to 
improvements constitutes separate property damage) is the fact that Block cannot reasonably 
argue the houses and improvements are not the subject of the transaction. In this case, there is 
only one transaction: Block's purchase of property from Streibick. There is no other contract at 
issue. R. Vol. I, pp. 20 - 23 (breach of contract claims against Streibick all stern out of the sale of 
11 See also State v. Mitchell Const. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984) (defective roof); 
Clark v. Int'! Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,332,581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978) (defective parts for a tractor); Ramerth v. 
Hart, 133 Idaho 194,196,983 P.2d 848,850 (1999) (defective airplane). 
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the property). Block relies on a footnote from Aardema l2 to show that the subject of the 
underlying transaction should only be considered to be "the four bare lots that comprised SP No. 
8 .... This real property is the subject of this lawsuit." Appellant's Brief, p. 39. As the Aardema 
footnote states, "the underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the 
transaction." Aardema, 147 Idaho at 791, 215 P.3d at 511 (fn. 2). Based on this footnote, the 
improvements which Block claims suffered property damage are still the subject of the 
transaction. 
Block purchased the property on August 10, 2005, while the property was still designated 
as SP 4, block No.3. R. Vol. I, p. 13.i3 In essence, Block was purchasing property which was 
being subdivided by Streibick, with the intent to subdivide it further. Block admits that he further 
subdivided SP 8 lots 1-4, and made at least 11 lots out of such properties. R. Vol. I, pp. 13 - 14. 
Block also admits he purchased the property with the intent to improve, develop, and build on 
the properties. R. Vol. II, p. 275 (Block Dep. p. 85). Block further admits that he purchased the 
property "for the purpose of constructing and selling single family residences." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 7. Block's admitted purpose in purchasing the property is similar, if not identical, to the 
situation in DutJin, where the plaintiffs purchased the seed potatoes with the understood intent 
that they would be planting the potatoes. See Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198. If the 
underlying contract in Du(fin had been deemed to merely be the purchase of the seed potatoes, 
then the economic loss rule should not have applied to the new potatoes (and potato plants) 
grown from such seeds, nor the resultant lost profits. In essence, the subject of the underlying 
12 Block cites to Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys., Inc .. 147 Idaho 785, 791,215 P.3d 505, 511 (2009) (Fn. 2). 
13 Block contends that he was purchasing lots 1-4 of SP 8, which is what the purchase documents say. 
However, even though Block intended to by lots 1-4 of SP 8, no such subdivision had been recorded or approved on 
Aug. 10,2005. The City Council meeting at which SP 8 was approved did not occur until August 15,2005. R. Vol. 
II, p. 368 - 370. Thus, Block was purchasing property which he knew to be in the subdivision approval process, but 
which had not yet been approved. 
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transaction must take into consideration the intended use of the purchased property, or else the 
purpose of the economic loss rule is gutted. 
For example, in Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 39, 740 P.2d 1022, 1024 
(1987), the plaintiffs were interested in "purchasing the duplexes [which were the subject of the 
transaction] as investment property." When problems arose with the property, the plaintiffs sued 
for "damages for loss of rental value and costs of repair." Id. at 40, 1025. This becomes 
significant because the type of damages sought in Duffin, Tusch, and this case are all essentially 
contract damages (i.e. lost profits for crops, lost rental value, and in this case, loss of value and 
loss of profits on sale, see Appellant's Brief, p. 17). The intent of the contract, whether 
purchasing seeds to plant, duplexes to rent, or property to develop and then sell, matters because 
the damages being sought are contract damages (i.e. expectation damages), which the economic 
loss rule says one cannot obtain in a tort action. While the contract may identify the property 
purchased (as opposed to the reason purchased), it is not the sole subject matter of the 
transaction. If that were the case, then lost profits would never be allowed as contract damages, 
because they were not the subject of the contract. 14 Block simply cannot say that the subject 
matter of the transaction was just four lots of earth, because the lots of earth were never intended 
to remain so. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. If the Court were to accept Block's interpretation of 
"subject matter of the transaction", the economic loss rule would never apply. Any improvement 
to the property would be sufficient to create new property which would or could result in 
separate property damage, rendering the economic loss rule ineffective. The City and Cutshaw 
request that this Court reject Block's interpretation that the damage to the improvements to the 
property constitutes "damage to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction." 
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196,983 P.2d 848,850 (1999). 
14 We know this is not true, because lost profits are allowed in contract actions. 
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Third, basic property law principles show that damage to the houses, pools, retaining 
walls, and other improvements does not constitute property damage. After Block purchased the 
property, there is no question that he made improvements. R. Vol. I, p. 14 - 15. However, every 
improvement he made became a fixture to the property. In Idaho, anything which is "affixed to 
the land" becomes part of the real property. Ie. § 55-101. When Block built the houses, pools, 
retaining walls, windows, gas lines, etc., there is no doubt that he actually annexed such items to 
the property, with the intent to make it permanent and adapted to the property. Everitt v. Higgins, 
122 Idaho 708, 711, 838 P.2d 311, 314 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus, even though at the time he 
purchased the property there were no improvements, at the time the defect manifested itself in 
2007, and again in 2009, such defect affected only things which were affixed to the real property, 
which means that only the real property was damaged. Block cannot argue that separate property 
damage occurred when legally, the only things that were damaged were the fixtures on the real 
property, which Block admits was the subject matter of the transaction. Appel/ant's Brief, p. 39. 
By affixing the houses and other improvements to the property, Block himself intended the 
improvements to become part of the real property (as evidenced by the fact that he was trying to 
sell the developed property with the houses and improvements on it, see R. Vol. I, p. 14 
(Complaint ~ 16). If there were different facts, such as that the defect in the property had 
damaged something not affixed to the property (i.e. a car, or as discussed in Aardema's, the cows 
which were not permanently affixed to the milking machines), a different discussion could be 
had. However, Block can point to no damages other than damages to what he built into and onto 
the property. Therefore, the only damage which has occurred affected the subject of the 
transaction itself (i.e. the real property), resulting in loss of value to the property. The City and 
Cutshaw request that this Court determine such damages are not recoverable under the economic 
15 Aardema, 147 Idaho at 791, 215 P.3d at 511. 
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loss rule. 
Finally, aside from the issue of whether the damaged property is the subject of the 
transaction, the City and Cutshaw contend that a number of reasons support the conclusion that 
the economic loss rule applies to all of Block's alleged damages. First, as stated at the beginning 
of this section, the point of the economic loss rule is to prevent a party from seeking in tort what 
they should be seeking in contract. Block admits that his damages are construction and 
abatement expenses, loss of value, and inability to sell the properties (or lost profits). Appellant's 
Brief, p. 17. All of these damages fit the definition of economic loss stated in Salmon River: 
"costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as 
well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon 
Rivers Sportsman Camps. Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 
(1975). In essence, Block has brought a negligence action against the City and Cutshaw to 
recover contract damages. However, Block also had a source against which he could recover 
contract damages: Streibick. 
In fact, the record shows that Block settled all of his claims with Streibick. R. Vol. IV, pp. 
727 - 28. A similar situation arose in Excel Const .. Inc. v. HKM Eng'g. Inc., 2010 WY 34, 228 
P.3d 40 (Wyo. 2010), which involved a contract between a contractor and an engineer regarding 
replacing a city's water lines. Id. at 42. Though addressing construction contracts, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court stated 
that parties to a construction contract have the opportunity to allocate the 
economic risks associated with the work, and that they do not need the special 
protections of tort law to shield them from losses arising from risks, including 
negligence of a design professional, which are inherent in performance of the 
contract. 
Id. at 45. Like the plaintiff in Excel Construction, Block "had the opportunity to allocate the risks 
associated with the costs of the work when it contracted with [Streibick] and, in fact, entered into 
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a detailed contract which allowed it the means, method and opportunity to recover economic 
losses allegedly caused by [the alleged] negligence." Id. Further, Block had a number of other 
contracts which he could have utilized to allocate his risk, such as with the company that did 
compaction16 testing or his engineer Hasenoehrl 17 (who worked on subdividing the properties, 
and whom he has chosen not to sue). That Block did not allocate his risks better does not mean 
he should be allowed to recover his contract damages in tort claims against the City and 
Cutshaw. Thus, Block has been paid for his contract claims, and should not be allowed to 
continue to seek contract damages against the City and Cutshaw under negligence claims. 
Block relies on a number of cases to show that the economic loss rule does not apply in 
this case. For example, Block relies on Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 
Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986). Though Block adequately states the facts of that case, Block 
fails to note the two essential distinguishing factors from this case: 1) the underlying contract 
was for provision of services, like Brian & Christie, Inc. 18, and 2) the plaintiff had had cattle 
stolen from him, not damaged. Oppenheimer Indus., Inc., 112 Idaho at 424 - 26, 732 P.2d at 662 
- 64. Neither of these features is present in this case. Block's situation is closer to Duffin, Tusch, 
Ramerth, Blahd, and all those cases in which the contract is for defective property. Further, as 
Block still acknowledges that he owns the property at issue, Oppenheimer does not apply. 
What Block refuses to acknowledge is that this present case is similar, if not identical, to 
Duffin. As discussed above, in Duffin, the State Department of Agriculture (who was not a party 
to the sales contract) was sued in negligence for failing to identify a disease in seed potatoes. 
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199. The same is true here: Block seeks to recover 
16 The compaction testing was done by Allwest Testing, and notified Block of certain concerns and problems 
with the property. See R. Vol. II, p. 333. 
17 See Appel/ant's Brief, p. 14. 
18 There was no defective property at issue in Oppenheimer. 
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against a governmental entity (who was not a party to the sales contract) for negligent inspection 
and for improperly issuing permits. R. Vol. I, p. 23 - 25 (Complaint, ~ 55 (allegations of the 
City's negligence». Block seeks the same types of damages here (lost value, lost profits, repair 
costs) as were sought in Dufjin (lost revenues, etc.). The City and Cutshaw contend that the 
result in this case should be no different than in Duffin. Block has suffered economic loss, and 
had the ability to sue under contract theories for these damages. He should not be able to recover 
the damages again in tort. 
Plaintiff also ignores a case recently decided which has very similar aspects to this case. 
In Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 (Idaho 
Dec. 20, 2012), the plaintiff contracted for a well to be drilled on his undeveloped property. Id. at 
* 1. After the well was installed, the plaintiff built a house and landscaped the property. Id. When 
the well collapsed, the plaintiff sued the well driller. Id. The plaintiff contended that the 
economic loss rule did not apply because the well collapse caused damage to his property. Id. at 
*7. This Court found that the plaintiff's allegation that the only property which was damaged 
was the well itself and the cost of tearing out surrounding landscaping to repair the well was 
insufficient to show property damage. Id. The same analysis applies to this case: Block's only 
damage was to the property he purchased and that which he affixed to the property. Like the 
plaintiff in Stapleton, Block has not identified any property damage which would support a 
negligence claim. 
The City and Cutshaw request that this Court affirm Judge Kerrick's determination that 
"the subject of the transaction is the property developed by Block which is contained within the 
subdivisions, as well as the houses built upon this property." R. Vol. IV, p. 822. The economic 
loss rule should apply to all of Block's damages, and all claims against the City and Cutshaw 
were properly dismissed. 
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2. No Exception to the Economic Loss Rule Applies in this Case. 
There are three exceptions where economic loss may be recovered in negligence claims. 
The City and Cutshaw contend that Judge Kerrick rightly concluded that none of such exceptions 
apply. 
First, "economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or 
property." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. As discussed above, there was no 
separate damage to person or property. All damage was to the "subject of the transaction." 
Therefore, this exception does not apply. 
Next, "Economic loss might also be recovered in tort where the occurrence of a unique 
circumstance requires a different allocation of the risk." Id. at 1007 - 08, 1200 - 01. See also 
Just's. Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470,583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978). Block makes 
no attempt to argue that such exception applies. Even if he did, there is no basis for this 
exception to apply. The purchase or subdivision of property is not a "'unique circumstance' 
requiring a re-allocation of the risk" any more than seed potato certification was in Duffin. 
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. As the Court stated in Blahd, "The purchase of a 
residential house is an everyday occurrence and does not create the type of unique circumstances 
required to justify a different allocation of risk, particularly where it appears there may be other 
defendants available to respond in contract damages." Blahd, 141 Idaho at 302, 108 P.3d at 1002. 
The same applies to subdivision, development, and sale of property. Therefore, this exception 
should not apply. 
Finally, "an exception to the economic loss rule is applicable in cases involving a 'special 
relationship' between the parties." Du{fin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Though Block 
does not argue the special relationship exception in his discussion of the economic loss rule, see 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 37 - 44, he does have a section titled "Special Relationship" in his 
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discussion of duty. Appellant's Brief, pp. 22 - 24. With regard to the special relationship 
exception, this Court has stated that 
There are only two situations in which this Court has found the special 
relationship exception applies. One situation is where a professional or quasi-
professional performs personal services .... The other situation involving a 
special relationship is where an entity holds itself out to the public as having 
expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces 
reliance on its performance of that function. 
Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001 (citing MeAlvain v. Genera/Ins. Co. o(Ameriea, 97 
Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976), and Dutfin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201). 
Unlike MeAlvain, the City and Cutshaw did not provide any professional services, nor does 
Block allege that they did so. 
With regard to the second part of the special relationship test, Block does not discuss it. 
Instead he focuses on whether a duty arose under the "public duty rule", Appellant's Brief, p. 23, 
which is quite different from the circumstances outlined in Blahd and Duffin. In Duffin, one 
defendant was a private, non-profit corporation which the Court pointed out "held itself out as 
having expertise in the performance of a specialized function; it is the only entity which can 
certify seed potatoes in the state of Idaho", and had engaged in a marketing campaign to induce 
people to buy seed that it had certified. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Thus, this 
Court held that the exception applied to that defendant. Id. There is no allegation that the City or 
Cutshaw engaged in such behavior in this case. Instead, the City and Cutshaw are analogous to 
the State Department of Agriculture in Dutfin, which the Court held did not hold itself out to the 
public as having expertise in a specific area. Id. Indeed, the City and Cutshaw did not hold 
themselves out as having expertise regarding a specialized function any more than did the 
Department of Agriculture in Duffin. See Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. Therefore, 
even if Block were arguing that the City and Cutshaw had a special relationship with Block, 
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there is no evidence to support such a contention. 
Based on the foregoing, the City and Cutshaw request that this Court find, as did Judge 
Kerrick, that "there is no evidence in this case that the City of Lewiston held itself out to the 
public as having expertise regarding a specialized function." R. Vol. IV, pp. 824 - 25. Because no 
exception to the economic loss rule applies, the City and Cutshaw request that this Court find 
that all of Block's damages are barred by the economic loss rule, and that summary judgment 
was properly granted. 
C. JUDGE KERRICK PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IMMUNITIES UNDER 
LC. §§ 6-904(1) & (7) AND 6-904B(3) & (4) APPLIED. 
This Court applies a three step analysis to determine whether summary judgment has 
properly been granted on the issue of immunities under the Idaho Tort Claims Act: 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity 
and its employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), this Court must 
engage in a three step analysis. First, we must determine whether tort recovery is 
allowed under the laws of Idaho. This is essentially a determination of whether 
there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, this Court determines if an 
exception to liability under the !TCA shields the alleged misconduct from 
liability. Finally, if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the 
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle 
the moving party to dismissal. 
Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 14 - 15 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the state of Idaho, see, e.g., Nation v. 
State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 487 (1995), and therefore do 
not address this first step of the analysis. Judge Kerrick found exceptions to liability on all claims 
against the City and Cutshaw under Ie. §§ 6-904(1) and 6-904B(3) & (4), and to Complaint ~ 
55(vi) under 1 e. § 6-904(7). R. Vol. IV, pp. 829 - 36. Block now contends that Judge Kerrick 
was mistaken on all these counts. 
1. Judge Kerrick Correctly Determined that Both the Lewiston City Counsel and 
City Engineer Shawn Stubbers Made Discretionary Acts Under Ie. § 6-904(1). 
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There are two separate immunities in 1 C. § 6-904(1): the statutory/regulatory function 
immunity, and the discretionary function immunity. 19 
A governmental entity and its employees . . . shall not be liable for any claim 
which: 
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity 
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a 
statutory or regulatory function ... Q! based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a 
governmental entity or employee thereof. 
1 C. § 6-904(1) (emphasis added). The "exercising ordinary care" requirement only applies to the 
statutory/regulatory function immunity, not discretionary function immunity. 
The "'regulatory function' and 'discretionary function' clauses of I.C. § 6-904(1) 
represented two different types of actions that might be immune under the ITCA 
but the same test applied to each." Leliefetd v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 363, 659 
P.2d 111, 117 (1983); see also Sterling, 111 Idaho at 229-30, 723 P.2d at 773-74. 
In Jones v. City ofS1. Maries, Justice Huntley noted that the first clause of I.C. § 
6-904(1) affords governmental employees immunity if they act with ordinary 
care and in accordance with policy decisions. 111 Idaho 733, 745, 727 P.2d 
1161, 1173 (1986) (Huntley, J., concurring). 
Rees v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,20, 137 P.3d 397, 407 (2006) (emphasis 
added). See also Lelie{eld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 363, 659 P.2d 111, 117 (1983) ("While the 
creation of a governing policy might well be discretionary, nonetheless, a negligent failure in the 
furtherance of that policy could well be tortious and outside the screen of immunity."); Lawton v. 
City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459, 886 P.2d 330, 335 (1994) (inclusion ofthe word "or" in a 
statute meant in the alternative, as opposed to requiring both elements). In other words, enacting 
a discretionary function will be immune if it is truly discretionary, but an employee's act in 
executing or performing as a statute or regulation requires will only be immune if the employee 
acts with ordinary care. 1 C. § 6-904(1). This is relevant because the City and Cutshaw only 
19 The immunities under this section will fail if there is malice or criminal intent. IC § 6-904. Block makes 
no allegation of malice or criminal intent, and so this issue is not discussed. 
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contended that they were entitled to discretionary function immunity under I C. § 6-904( 1 ), 
which is the immunity Judge Kerrick addressed in his rulings. See R. Vol. IV, pp. 831 - 35. 
Therefore, Block's discussion of whether the City and/or Cutshaw acted with ordinary care20 is 
irrelevant. 
"The discretionary function exception applies to governmental decisions entailing 
planning or policy formation." Dorea Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425, 
163 P.3d 211, 214 (2007). "Routine, everyday matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy 
factors will more likely than not be 'operational.' Decisions and actions which involve a 
consideration of the financial, political, economic and social effects of a given plan or policy will 
generally be 'planning' and fall within the discretionary function exception." Ransom v. City of 
Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 205, 743 P.2d 70, 73 (1987). If the decision is discretionary, the 
Court then examines "the underlying policies of the discretionary function, which are: to permit 
those who govern to do so without being unduly inhibited by the threat of liability for tortious 
conduct, and also, to limit judicial re-examination of basic policy decisions properly entrusted to 
other branches of government." Dorea Enterprises, Inc, 144 Idaho at 425, 163 P.3d at 214. 
Two decisions which were relevant to this case fall under the discretionary function 
immunity. First, in 1997, the Lewiston City Council adopted a revised subdivision code 
(pursuant to City Ordinance 4177) which removed all mandatory requirements for slope stability 
or geotechnical analyses, and instead gave the city engineer discretion when to require such 
studies. R. Vol. II, pp. 387 - 440 (specifically §§ 32-9(b)(2)(f), 32-20(c)(2) and 32-31(e)). 
Second, Lewiston City Engineer Shawn Stubbers made a decision, based on numerous policy 
factors, not to require a geotechnical/slope stability analysis of the property at issue. R. Vol. IV, 
p. 834. Block fails to address either of these discretionary decisions in his briefing, see 
20 Appellant's Brief, pp. 27 31. 
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Appellant's Brief, pp. 26 - 31, even though they are the basis of Judge Kerrick's determination 
that discretionary immunity applies. R. Vol. IV, pp. 831 - 35. Instead, Block discusses acts that 
show that the City did not act with reasonable care. However, as discussed above, this is 
irrelevant for purposes of discretionary function immunity. 
The City contends that Block's alleged damages purportedly arise out of the fact that no 
geotechnical evaluation was required during subdivision of the property. R. Vol. IV, p. 834. 
Block confirms this. Appellant's Brief, p. 30 (failing to require geotechnical studies was 
negligent). Therefore, the change to the city codes and the decision not to require a geotechnical 
analysis are the decisions which allegedly lead to his damages. But the decisions should be 
deemed discretionary. Based on the changes to the Lewiston City Code, a policy shift occurred 
whereby mandatory slope stability analysis was no longer required. The enacting of city 
ordinances by a city council is clearly the type of policy or planning decision that should be 
treated as discretionary, and also fits the underlying policies of the immunity. See Dorea 
Enterprises, Inc., 144 Idaho at 425, 163 P.3d at 214 ("greater rank or authority will most likely 
coincide with greater responsibility for planning or policy formation decisions"); City of 
Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 855, 853 P.2d 596, 600 (Ct. App. 1993) (city's decision 
when to purchase property was discretionary). 
Similarly, the decision by Lewiston City Engineer Shawn Stubbers not to require a 
geotechnical analysis of the property during the subdivision process was also discretionary. This 
Court has several times recognized that governmental employee decisions can rise to the level of 
discretionary functions. For example, in Dorea, when a sewage department supervisor 
considered a number of factors, including "money, budgets, the amount of people that [they] had, 
[specifically,] the amount of educated people," when deciding how often to flush out the city's 
sewer system, that decision was deemed to be policy making and, ultimately, discretionary. 
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Dorea Enterprises, Inc., 144 Idaho at 426, 163 P.3d 211, 215 (2007). As this Court has stated, 
"decisions made under statutes and regulations which leave room for policy judgment in their 
execution are discretionary." Crown v. State, Dept. ofAgric., 127 Idaho 175, 181,898 P.2d 1086, 
1092 (1995). The Lewiston City Code language at issue gave the City Engineer broad discretion 
as to when to require a geotechnical or slop stability analysis. R. Vol. 11, pp. 387 - 440 
(specifically §§ 32-9(b)(2)(f), 32-20(c)(2) and 32-31(e)). Indeed, Mr. Stubbers decision was 
based on numerous policy factors: the limited time in which a subdivision application could be 
reviewed, staff training, budgetary concerns, discussion with outside experts, etc. R. Vol. III, pp. 
645,648 (Stubbers Dep., pp. 37 - 38,52); R. Vol. IV, p. 834. This sort of decision also fulfills the 
underlying policies of discretionary immunity, in avoiding second guessing decisions made by 
the city engineer, and avoiding liability for decisions with regard to subdivision applications. 
Based on the foregoing, the City and Cutshaw ask this Court to conclude that Judge 
Kerrick properly dismissed all of Block's claims under the discretionary function immunity. 
Numerous other discretionary functions2] discussed in the briefing before the District Court, but 
not relied on in Judge Kerrick's Memorandum Decisions, will not be addressed at this point. 
2. Because there are No Issues of Material Fact as to Gross Negligence, Judge 
Kerrick Properly Granted Immunity under Ie. § 6-904B(3) & (4). 
Under Ie. §§ 6-904B(3) & (4), the City and Cutshaw are immune from any claim that 
"Arises out of the issuance ... or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization," or "Arises out of the failure to make 
an inspection, or the making of an inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other 
than the property of the governmental entity performing the inspection," unless an employee 
acted with "malice or criminal intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and 
21 Such as the policy decision not to copy entire subdivision files to place in a new subdivision files. See R. 
Vol. I, p. 232 - 33, Vol. IV, p. 716. 
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wanton conduct." See Hoffer v. City o(Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 403,257 PJd 1226, 1229 (2011) 
(allegations of malice, criminal intent, etc. only apply to employees, and not the city itself). 
Judge Kerrick concluded that the language of Ie. § 6-904B(3) & (4) was broad enough 
to cover "any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other permits, 
approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue." R. Vol. IV, p. 
830. Because the underlying basis of all of Block's claims was the alleged failure to inspect, 
require studies, or the issuance of permits, the immunity under these statutes required dismissal 
of all claims. Id. at 829 - 30. Block now appeals on the basis that there is a question of fact as to 
whether "the City acted with gross negligence.,,22 Appellant's Brief, p. 34 (emphasis added). 
As a matter of law, a City cannot act with gross negligence. In Hotter, the plaintiff sued 
the City of Boise for various tort claims under the I.T.C.A, alleging that various city employees 
acted with malice and criminal intent. Hoffer, 151 Idaho at 401, 257 P.3d at 1227. This Court 
upheld dismissal of the claims, in part, on the grounds that no city employee was named as a 
party to the lawsuit, stating 
Because Hoffer only appeals the dismissal of claims that are included within that 
section, and because he did not name any individual employee as a defendant, as a 
matter of law under I.C. § 6-904(3) he could not recover against the City. The 
district court was correct in dismissing those claims. If he had included an 
employee as a defendant, his claims against that employee alleging malice or 
criminal intent would have survived under I.e. § 6-904(3) because an employee 
is only immune from suit for those intentional torts if there is no allegation of 
malice and/or criminal intent. 
Id., at 403, 1229. In other words, the umbrella language of Ie. § 6-904 stating that the 
immunities fail if there is malice or criminal intent only applies to city employees named as 
parties to the lawsuit; the city itself cannot have malice or criminal intent. 
Though Hofftr dealt with 1 e. § 6-904, the umbrella language of 1 e. § 6-904B exactly 
22 Block does not discuss malice, criminal intent, or reckless, willful and wanton conduct in his brief, so they 
will not be discussed here. 
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mirrors the structure of 1 C. § 6-904, but just adds "gross negligence" and "reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct" to the list of conduct that would preclude the immunity's application. Thus, the 
City of Lewiston cannot be grossly negligent; only its employees can. Block only named one 
Lewiston employee to this lawsuit, and that was former City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw. Taking 
this a step further, there is not a single issue of fact that Cutshaw acted with gross negligence. 
None of Block's alleged material facts listed on Appellant's Brief, pp. 34 - 36 identify any act or 
inaction of Lowell Cutshaw.23 Block's statement of facts only mentions Cutshaw to indicate that 
he was an employee of the City, and that he attended a meeting with Block. Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 7, 16. In order to establish that Cutshaw acted with gross negligence, Block will have to 
show that Cutshaw did or failed to do 
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar 
responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to 
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows 
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. 
I C. § 6-904C(1). Though Block contends that the District Court improperly determined that 
Block had a high burden to overcome with regard to immunities24, Appellant's Brief, pp. 33 - 34, 
Block cannot argue that he had no burden. Once a governmental entity contends that an 
immunity applies, 
the plaintiff must prove a claim which does not fall within the exception to 
governmental liability ... and must establish that the governmental entity, or its 
employees acting within the course and scope of their employment, was negligent 
or [committed] otherwise wrongful acts or omissions which were the proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 
23 Instead, they list comments by City Public Works Director Chris Davies, Building Official John Smith, 
Assistant City Engineer Shawn Stubbers, and a number of other former and current employees, none of whom are 
parties to this lawsuit. 
24 Block misconstrues Judge Kerrick's statement in this regard. The case Judge Kerrick relied on only stood 
for the proposition that an employee is presumed to be acting without malice or criminal intent, and so Block would 
have to overcome this presumption. R. Vol. IV, p. 830 (citing Boise Tower Associates. LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 
774, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009». As Block was not alleging malice or criminal intent, this did not become an 
issue. Block only had to meet his burden to show evidence of gross negligence. 
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Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 364, 716 P.2d 505,508 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, it is Block's burden to establish that Cutshaw acted or failed to act in a way that he should 
have been inescapably drawn to recognize as his duty, and acted with deliberate indifference to 
harmful consequences. So far, all Block has alleged was that Cutshaw was an employee, and had 
attended a meeting. This scintilla of information does not establish that Cutshaw had any 
particular duty (or should have been drawn to recognize a duty). Further, the fact that Cutshaw 
attended a meeting does not show deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to Block, 
and is not sufficient to overturn entry of summary judgment on this issue. See G & M Farms v. 
Funk!rr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) ("plaintiffs case must be anchored 
in something more than speculation and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue"). Therefore, as there is no evidence that the only employee sued acted with gross 
negligence, Block has not met his burden. Summary jUdgment was appropriately granted based 
on this immunity. 
Even were this Court to determine (contrary to Hofftr) that the gross negligence 
exception applies to the City itself (or any unnamed employee), Block still cannot show that 
gross negligence occurred. All of Block's allegations of gross negligence revolve around the fact 
that the City failed to notify Block that the slope movement had apparently occurred. Appel/ant's 
Brief, pp. 34 - 36. However, failure to notify does not establish gross negligence on its own. 
Even if it is assumed that the City or some nameless employee had such a duty25, there is no 
evidence that failing to notify Block resulted in deliberate indifference to the harmful 
consequences to Block. First, the City hid nothing. The memo regarding the earth movement was 
25 Block can point to no specific duty in either statute or city code which requires the City to search records 
and provide all information about a property to a subdivider; instead, he relies on comments made by City 
employees which are taken out of context to show a duty exists. Appellant's Brief, pp. 35 - 36. 
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prominently placed in a publicly available file26, giving potential purchasers and developers (at 
least those who did due diligence and looked in such files prior to purchasing such property) all 
the notice they needed as to the issue. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 7 ("Constructive notice is 
meant to protect innocent persons about to engage in lawful transactions, by encouraging 
diligence in protecting one's rights and preventing fraud. It is based on the premise that citizens 
have no right to shut their eyes or ears to avoid information and then say they had no notice. "). 
Second, and crucial to the determination of gross negligence, is an analysis of what the 
City could have known simply from the memo in the file. Looking at the memo, all a person 
would know is that in March, 1999, a non-city employee provided pictures of alleged earth 
movement to the City. R. Vol. II, p. 248. The memo does not say what caused the earth 
movement (or how it is known that the land in the photo has suffered earth movement), and does 
not state when the alleged earth movement occurred, whether it was stable or active, or a myriad 
of other factors that would affect any future decisions about the property. Id. It is impossible for 
the City to be indifferent to harmful consequences when there is no evidence that harmful 
consequences would or could result. 27 In other words, the City and its employees, just based on 
the memo in the file, had no knowledge that there was unstable ground in the area. All they had 
was a photograph of a crack in some ground, which a non-city employee claimed showed earth 
movement. But since no study was done on the property (by the owner of the property or by the 
photograph taker), and no study results were provided to the City, the City had no basis to 
believe the property shouldn't be developed or built on. Thus, Block cannot show that there was 
gross negligence as defined by J C. § 6-904C(1). 
26 See R. Vol. II, p. 278, Block Dep., p. 180 (Block stated he found it immediately upon searching the SP4 
subdivision file). 
27 If Block's own experts don't know what is causing the earth movement, see R. Vol. IV, p. 714, then it 
would be impossible for the City or its employees, based on a picture of a crack in the ground, to determine whether 
the situation is unsafe, or even whether the crack is 40 years old or more. 
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Third, what also is known from the file is that the then property owner (Streibick) was 
notified about the condition on the property. R. Vol. II, p. 249 - 51. Contrary to showing that the 
City was indifferent to harmful consequences, the City took action by notifying the current 
landowner so that he could address the issue. Instead, without notifying the City, Streibick 
covered up the cracks, and never attempted to find out how old they were or what caused them. 
R. Vol. II, p. 269 (Morrison Dep., p. 57). Block has presented no evidence that if the City did 
inspect the property any time between 1999 and 2005, it would have discovered slope movement 
(as such movement had been hidden). 
The result is that Block has not met his burden to show that the City and its employees 
(especially Cutshaw) acted with gross negligence. This is not a situation like S. Gri(fin Canst .. 
Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 190-91, 16 P.3d 278, 287-88 (2000) where the city's 
failure to inspect a building about to be torn down resulted in missing the fact that adjacent 
buildings were connected (and thus creating an issue of fact whether gross negligence occurred). 
This case is more similar to Crown v. State. Dept. ofAgric., 127 Idaho 188, 190, 898 P.2d 1099, 
1101 (Ct. App. 1994) (affd in part, rev'd in part28, 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995», where 
a state inspector, despite having been notified of a potential deficit in inventory, failed to 
discover that a warehouse manager had fraudulently inflated the inventory of beans in the 
warehouse by putting hundreds of boxes full of dirt in the warehouse. After reviewing the record, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that "uncontroverted evidence sufficiently justified an 
inference that Mr. Sparrow [the inspector] did not act, or omit to act, with deliberate 
indifference, and hence that he was not grossly negligent as defined by I.C. § 6-904C." Id. at 
193,1104. 
28 Crown was not reversed based on any discussion of gross negligence. See Crown v. State, Dept. ofAgric., 
127 Idaho 175, 179, 898 P.2d 1086, 1090 (1995). 
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In this case, Block has provided no evidence that a geotechnical evaluation would have 
discovered the hidden slope movement. As no geotechnical evaluation has ever been done on the 
property, there is no evidence that a geotechnical evaluation would have provided Block with 
any information regarding conditions on the property. Thus, the fact that the City and employees 
did not inform Block of a memo in a file is not sufficient to show gross negligence. The City and 
Cutshaw request that this Court find, as did Judge Kerrick, that there was no deliberate 
indifference to harmful consequences. R. Vol. IV, p. 830. 
3. Judge Kerrick Correctly Determined that the Subdivision Plats Contained Public 
Property as used in 1 C. § 6-904(7). 
The immunity allowed under 1 C. § 6-904(7) states that 
A governmental entity and its employees . . . shall not be liable for any claim 
which: 
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, 
roads, streets. bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is 
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in 
effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of 
the construction bv the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some 
other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give 
such approval. 
1 C. § 6-904(7) (emphasis added). Judge Kerrick found that the City and Cutshaw were immune 
under this provision only to Complaint ~ 55(vi) (which alleged that the City was negligent in 
approving the subdivision plats for CG and CG 2). R. Vol. IV, pp. 835 - 36. Block contends that 
this immunity does not apply because there was no public property at issue, and argues that all 
property was private. Appellant's Brief, pp. 32 - 33. There is no dispute that each subdivision 
plat at issue (including SP 4, SP 8, CG and CG 2) contained easements dedicated to the City. The 
Administrative Plat for SP 8 contains city roads, storm sewer easements, a storm drain easement 
connected to a public easement for a detention pond, and stream easements. R. Vol. II, pp. 257 -
58. The Amended Administrative Plat for SP 8 shows the same, with additional public 
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easements. Id, pp. 259 - 60. The Administrative Plat for CG shows the easements described 
above, with additional public easements, and specifically shows the detention pond, which is 
labeled as "Storm Drain Pond Easement". Id, pp. 261 - 62. All of these plats were approved by 
the Lewiston City Council, and all of them were prepared by Block's own engineer Eric 
HasenoehrI of Keltic Engineering. Id., pp. 257 - 62. Thus, the plats are a plan, and either meet 
the substantial conformance requirement29 or the approved in advance requirement. See Lawton 
v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459, 886 P.2d 330, 335 (1994) (immunity is available if 
either substantial conformance or advance approval element is met). Thus, the only question is 
whether the easements constitute public property. 
Block argues that this immunity only applies to "public projects". Appellant's Brief, p. 
33. However, the statute does not use that language; instead, by its own plain language, it applies 
to "public property." Ie. § 6-904(7). All of the easements and rights-of-way on the plat maps 
constitute public property. The Lewiston City Code states that 
Sec. 31-3. Right-of-way work - Permit required No person shall dig up, break, 
excavate, obstruct, tunnel, undermine, or disturb any street or other public 
property, place any obstruction thereon or fill in, place, leave, or deposit upon the 
same any earth, rubbish, garbage, rock or other material that may obstruct, disturb 
or interfere with the free use thereof without first obtaining a permit therefor from 
the department. 
Lewiston City Code § 31-3?O A right of way is defined as "improved or unimproved public 
property, dedicated or deeded to the city for the purpose of providing for vehicular, pedestrian 
and public use." Id § 31-2. Rights-of-way include utility easements. Id § 31-9. The City Code 
defines an easement as "A grant by the owner of the use of a parcel of land by the public, 
29 As the plans were prepared by Block's own engineer, Block cannot argue that the plans were not prepared 
in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards, or else he is admitting he submitted improper (and 
possibly) negligent plans to the City for approval. 
30 It is appropriate for Courts to take judicial notice of city ordinances. See City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 
Idaho 322, 328, 420 P.2d 805, 811 (1966). See also I.e. § 9-101(3). 
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corporation, or persons for a specified use and purposes and so designated on a plat." Id. § 32-4. 
Based on these codes, no structures may be built on utility easements, no property owner could 
have done work on the easements, and all storm and wastewater easements must be kept in a 
condition to provide access to the City. See id., § 36-1. Indeed, this Court has recognized that a 
utility easement constitutes a taking, though not a compensable one. See Hughes v. State, 80 
Idaho 286, 293, 328 P.2d 397, 401 (1958) (overruled by Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 
Idaho 536, 542, 96 P.3d 637,643 (2004)). 
Based on the language in the Lewiston City Code, it is difficult to imagine that the storm 
water/sewer easements and dedications for public roads included on the subdivision plats do not 
constitute public property. Block could not interfere with or build on them, and had to maintain 
access for City use. Even utilizing Block's definition, see Appellant's Brief, p. 33, the easements 
were not restricted to any individual's use. Though an easement may run through an individual's 
property, it is dedicated to the City's use, and should be considered public property for the 
purposes of immunity under I C. § 6-904(7). Therefore, the City and Cutshaw request that this 
Court affirm Judge Kerrick's ruling with regard to plan/design immunity. 
D. THE CITY AND CUTSHAW CONTEND THAT THERE ARE OTHER BASES 
FOR AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL. 
The Supreme Court has recently stated that, "The respondent can seek to sustain a 
judgment for reasons that were presented to the trial court even though they were not addressed 
or relied upon by the trial court in its decision." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. 
Inc., 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 at *6 (Idaho Dec. 20, 2012). See also Walker v. Shoshone 
County, 112 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290,292 (1987). The City and Cutshaw contend that there 
were several issues presented to the District Court which were not ruled on. See R. Vol. IV, p. 
827 (fn. 3). 
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The City and Cutshaw contend that the following are issues (which were presented to the 
District Court) which show that granting summary judgment was appropriate: 
1. Block could not establish what caused his damages because he could not establish 
what caused the earth movement. R. Vol. I, pp. 201 - 02; Vol. IV, p. 714 (the City 
and Cutshaw's briefing on such issue). 
2. The City owed no duty to Block to require a geotechnical evaluation be done on 
the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 199 - 201; R. Vol. IV, pp. 711 - 12 (briefing on such 
issue). 
3. The City had no affirmative duty to seek out and disclose every piece of 
information which was freely available in a public file. R. Vol. V, pp. 990 - 91 
(briefing on this issue, which Block raised for the first time in his Motion for 
Reconsideration). 
4. The decision by the City not to do research into a property for developers and not 
to put copies of all documents contained in prior subdivision files into new 
subdivision files (when an old subdivision is resubdivided) constitutes a 
discretionary decision for purposes of immunity under 1 e. § 6-904(1). R. Vol. I, 
pp. 206 - 07; R. Vol. IV, pp. 715 - 16 (briefing on this issue). 
As these issues have been previously briefed (see the citations to the record cited above), 
aIld as Block did not address these issues in his opening brief, these arguments will not be 
repeated at length. The City and Cutshaw request that the Court consider the briefing previously 
provided to the District Court on these issues as a basis for affirming the Judgment on other 
grounds. 
E. THE CITY AND CUTSHAW ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE BLOCK'S APPEAL IS WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN LA \V OR 
FACT. 
The City and Cutshaw request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Ie. §§ 12-117 and 6-
918A. 1 e. § 12-117 applies because the City is a political subdivision as defined by the statute, 
see 1 e. § 12-117(5)(b), and 1 e. § 6-918A applies because this case is brought under the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act. Both statutes have a similar standard. Under Ie. § 12-117, attorney fees shall 
be awarded if the court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in 
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fact or law." I.C. § 12-117(1). Under Ie. § 6-918A, the Court may award attorney fees to the 
prevailing party if "the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith 
in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.,,31 
Regardless of which statute applies, the City and Cutshaw contend that there is no basis 
for Block's appeal. As to the duty issues, Block's argument is that a duty was owed to him on 
several grounds, but ignores the fact that Judge Kerrick only decided that no duty was owed to 
Block before Block purchased the property at issue. There is no basis for Block to argue that a 
City owes a duty as to all future property owners. As to economic loss, Block can point to no 
Idaho or other state caselaw which supports his contention that the damage to his improvements 
to the property at issue constitutes anything other than economic loss. 
On the issue of immunities, Block spends a majority of his argument on Ie. § 6-904(1) 
directed at the "ordinary care" issues under the statutory/regulatory function immunity, when 
Judge Kerrick did not even grant summary judgment under that immunity. As to the immunity 
under Ie. § 6-904B(3) & (4), Block points to absolutely no issue of fact which relates to whether 
the City and/or Cutshaw acted with gross negligence, and as a matter of law, the City itself 
cannot act with gross negligence. Finally, Block contends that immunity was improper under Ie. 
§ 6-904(7) by trying to convince this court that dedications for public easements for water, 
sewer, streets, and other drainage issues do not constitute "public property". Block presents no 
new facts or law to this Court, and provides no reasonable basis on which to overturn Judge 
Kerrick's ruling. Therefore, his appeal is without reasonable basis in fact or law, and is in bad 
faith. 
31 There is some confusion as to whether one of these statutes applies over the other. Compare Beehler v. 
Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658,182 P.3d 713,715 (Ct. App. 2008) (I.e. § 6-918A is exclusive over I.e. § 12-
117) with Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 811, 229 P.3d 1164, 1173 (2010) (I. e. § 12-117 is exclusive as 
to I.e. § 6-918A). Brown does not discuss Beehler, nor explicitly overrule it, so it is unclear whether one statute is 
exclusive. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 44 
As to costs, if the City and Cutshaw prevail on appeal, they are entitled to costs pursuant 
to IR.C.P. 54 and IA.R. 40 as the prevailing party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City and Cutshaw respectfully request that this Court affirm 
Judge Kerrick's grant of summary judgment on all grounds. 
~ 
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